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Abstract
This paper investigates the impact of emigration on the political choice regarding the
size of the welfare state. Mobility has two countervailing e¤ects: the political participation
e¤ect and the tax base e¤ect. With emigration, the composition of the constituency changes.
This increases the political inuence of the less mobile part of the population. The new
political majority has to take into account that emigration reduces tax revenues and thereby
a¤ects the feasible set of redistribution policies. The interaction of the two e¤ects has so far
not been analyzed in isolation. We nd that the direction of the total e¤ect of migration
depends on the initial income distribution in the economy. Our results also contribute to
the empirical debate on the validity of the median-voter approach for explaining the relation
between income inequality and redistribution levels.
JEL Classication: F22, H50, D31, D72
KEYWORDS: migration, redistribution, voting
Department of Economics, University of Munich, Akademiestr. 1/III, 80799 Munich, Tel.: +49 89 2180
2766, Fax: +49 89 2180 2767, email: boerner@lmu.de
yCenter for Economic Studies, Schackstr.4, 80539 Munich, Tel.: +49 89 2180 5020, Fax: +49 89 397 303,
email: uebelmesser@lmu.de
1
1 Introduction
One of the big puzzles concerning the political economy of the welfare state is why we only
observe systems with limited redistribution. This is surprising because income distributions
are usually skewed to the right. Thus, the net recipients of redistribution policies have more
political decision-making power. The literature on endogenous limits to the size of the welfare
state explains this observation by broadly following two lines: The rst considers the self-interest
of poorer citizens, i.e., their expectation of upwards mobility or their consideration of potential
reactions of richer citizens. The second category looks at features of the political process such
as the under-representation of the poor to explain the outcome of limited redistribution.1
In our paper, we focus on the rst line of research. It has been strongly inuenced by Meltzer
and Richard (1981) who use the e¤ects of taxation on the labor-leisure choice of citizens to
derive a tax base e¤ect that limits redistribution. The chosen setting is a closed economy.
When voting, citizens rationally take into account that their fellow citizens might substitute
labor with leisure as a reaction to higher taxes. A higher tax level can thus reduce the overall
tax revenue. Together with the requirement of a balanced budget this creates an upper bound
for redistribution policies and constrains the net recipientsdemand for a large welfare state.
The migration literature has contributed a similar argument within the context of an open
economy: As tax increases may prompt net contributors to a redistributive system to leave
the jurisdiction, migration leads to a tax base e¤ect similar to the one found by Meltzer and
Richard. The net recipients rationally take into account that the proportion of net contributors
shrinks with higher tax rates. This limits their demand for more redistribution. Yet, when we
consider the e¤ects of migration, the tax base e¤ect is not the only factor that inuences the
political decision.
The contribution of our paper is to identify two separate e¤ects of mobility on the size of
the welfare state and to analyze their interaction. These are related to the two di¤erent roles
of citizens: one as taxpayers and the other as voters. First, if taxpayers leave a jurisdiction,
migration lets the tax base shrink. Second, also the composition of the constituency that decides
on redistributive policies changes with mobility. As some groups of voters emigrate, the political
1For a recent overview over these approaches, see Harms and Zink (2003).
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inuence of the less mobile groups in the population increases. This shifts the political majority
and therefore the preferred policy of the constituency. For example, if net contributors emigrate
disproportionately more, ceteris paribus, the political majoritys preference shifts towards a
higher level of redistribution. The political participation e¤ect thus works in the direction
opposite to the tax base e¤ect and increases the equilibrium size of the welfare state. The
literature so far does not explicitly discuss the interaction of both e¤ects. In our median-
voter model, we investigate how each of them shapes the redistribution outcome in political
equilibrium. Thereby, we assess the overall impact of migration on the political choice of the
size of the welfare state.
The purpose of this paper is to present a complete picture about the e¤ects of migration
on the welfare state within a political economy setup. In particular, we discuss the interaction
of the tax base e¤ect and the political participation e¤ect and derive conditions under which
the total e¤ect is negative or positive.
We nd that the direction of the total e¤ect of migration depends on the initial income
distribution in the economy. Moreover, our model naturally extends to a setting with mobile
companies. With mobile companies, the tax base e¤ect outweighs the political participation
e¤ect. Thus, increased mobility of companies might threaten existing welfare states.
Our results also contribute to the empirical debate on the validity of the median-voter
approach for explaining the relation between income inequality and redistribution levels. This
literature has not found convincing support for the hypothesis that a more skewed income
distribution, with the median income below the average income, leads to more redistribution
(Perotti, 1996, Lindert 1996, Milanovic, 2000). By taking into account both countervailing
e¤ects of mobility our model shows how the median voter approach may be reconciled with the
data. In open economies, the tax base e¤ect and the political participation e¤ect counteract
each other. It is therefore not surprising when the overall e¤ect is smaller than expected or
even insignicant.
The setup of the paper is as follows: In section 2, we discuss the related literature. We then
set out the basic model in section 3. In section 4, we compare the impacts of the tax base e¤ect
and the political participation e¤ect and discuss our results on the total e¤ect of migration on
the size of the welfare state. Section 5 concludes.
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2 Related Literature
Our paper links migration to the political economy of the welfare state. In a closed economy
setting, redistribution is limited by potential tax-avoiding reactions of the net contributors.
If voters take this into account, there is an endogenous upper bound on the size of welfare
state (Meltzer and Richard, 1981). This holds even more in an open economy setting: Voters
understand that high taxes lead to emigration of taxpayers and thereby reduce the tax revenue
available for redistribution. Thus, they rationally refrain from demanding excessively high
taxes. The total amount of redistribution is reduced by the possibility of migration (see, e.g.,
Wilson, 1982, Janeba and Ra¤, 1997, and the survey by Cremer et al., 1996).2
One strand of the migration literature uses a setup with competing jurisdictions or countries.
In equilibrium, all citizens are distributed over the jurisdictions without further incentives to
migrate. When mobility increases with income, in a setup with systems competition, several
jurisdictions compete for the net contributors to the welfare state. Then, the tax base e¤ect
leads to a race to the bottom, resulting in the extreme in the abolition of the welfare state
(Janeba and Ra¤, 1997).
This result can be avoided by enlarging the framework in several directions. With interre-
gional transfers, the equilibrium outcome di¤ers from the race to the bottom scenario. Kessler
and Hansen (2004) show that when jurisdictions are linked by interregional transfers, redistrib-
utive policies can be asymmetric across regions. Interregional transfers act as a substitute for
redistributive policies and can thereby restrain migration.
The result is also mitigated whenever mobility costs are considered, either as pecuniary
costs or as a non-pecuniary attachment to home (e.g., Haupt and Peters, 2003, or Mansoorian
and Myers, 1993). In multi-community models with migration costs, we get the well-known
stratication result, going back to Tiebout (1956). Citizens with similar preferences for taxes
and government spending or public good provision group together in one jurisdiction (see, e.g.,
Epple and Romer, 1991, Epple, Filimon, and Romer, 1984, Fernandez and Rogerson, 1996 and
1997, Glomm and Laguno¤, 1998, Hansen and Kessler 2001b, or Nechyba, 1997). Implicitly,
2An exception is Hindricks (2001) who analyzes the case where the poor are more mobile. He nds that the
equilibrium amount of redistribution can increase in this setting. In particular, taxes can be ine¢ ciently high as
any improvement of the tax schedule, might attract voters with an interest in less redistribution. As lower taxes
would shift the political equilibrium towards a smaller welfare state, the current majority tries to avoid this.
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there, citizens anticipate how the political equilibrium in their destination jurisdiction is a¤ected
by their migration decision and thus migrate strategically. Hansen and Kessler (2001a) include
geographical size constraints into their model.
This literature, however, does not explicitly disentangle the tax base e¤ect and the political
participation e¤ect.3 The reason is that most papers analyze the equilibrium after migration
only. In equilibrium, by denition, no one migrates. This implies of course that the e¤ects of
migration on the tax base and on the constituency are already incorporated in the equilibrium
outcome. Stratication then leads to the dominance of either the tax base or the political
participation e¤ect. For example, Epple and Romer (1991) nd more redistribution, the poorer
the jurisdiction. It is not entirely clear, however, how the nal level of redistribution in a single
jurisdiction is determined by outward mobility of tax payers and voters, compared to the
situation before migration.
Our model has a di¤erent focus: We use a stylized setup where we focus on potential out-
migration from a small (high-tax) country with a redistributive welfare state. The environment
of that country, the destination of emigration, is assumed to be a large (low-tax) country with
a small or no welfare state. From the perspective of the small country, the redistribution policy
of the destination country is given. This implies that the potential migrants face a xed outside
option. Moreover, migration behavior in our model is such that we do not get stratication but
have emigrants from all income groups in di¤erent proportions. This setup allows us to focus on
the e¤ects of outward migration on the tax base and on the composition of the constituency in
the small country. In such a framework, also the political participation e¤ect becomes visible.
Our political participation e¤ect could also be implied by strategic considerations of politi-
cians: Incumbents could deliberately use policies that induce emigration of a part of the citizens
in order to shape their constituency and ensure reelection. Glaeser and Shleifer (2002) term
this the Curley E¤ect, after the Boston mayor James Curley who, in the rst half of the
3To the best of our knowledge, the only contribution that explicitly considers the political participation e¤ect
is by Lorz and Nastassine (2004). In their citizen-candidate model, more mobile citizens prefer a smaller welfare
state. As they are more prone to migrate, they have less incentives for political participation. Thus, the political
inuence is shifted towards the proponents of a larger welfare state. In another context, Bolton and Roland
(1997) introduce an explicit discussion of e¤ects similar to the tax base and the political participation e¤ect. In
their analysis of possible reasons for the breakup of a nation state the authors identify a political factor, arising
due to di¤erent political preferences (which are, in turn, determined by the income composition) in the region,
and a tax base factor, due to di¤erent income distributions across regions. Yet, except for the separation of a
whole region, there is no migration.
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last century, ensured his political majority among the poor Irish inhabitants by implementing
policies that induced richer citizens to emigrate into the suburbs. The authors show that such
a behavior, while successful politically, can result in pareto inferior economic outcomes.4 In
this model, we do not consider any strategic behavior of the political leaders. Instead, we use
a pure median voter approach. As some citizens emigrate, the political participation e¤ect
shapes the constituency and thus determines the position of the median voter.
3 The Model
In our model, the citizens of our country can vote on the size of the welfare state, i.e., on the
tax level and the associated redistributive transfers. In what follows, by size of the welfare
state we understand the level of the income tax in the economy. Furthermore, citizens have the
possibility to leave the country. We are interested in seeing how the case of a closed economy
without migration where all citizens vote and pay taxes compares to the case of an open
economy where migrants neither vote nor pay taxes in their country of origin. In this section,
we rst describe the basic features of our economy. Then, we discuss the voting game on the
welfare state for the closed economy setting and the open economy setting with emigration. We
derive the implications both for the composition of the constituency and the political decision
on the size of the welfare state.
3.1 Setup of the Model
In our model, the redistributive welfare state is nanced by a proportional income or wage tax
 . It is determined in the political equilibrium. Redistribution is e¤ectuated via lump-sum
transfers T beneting all citizens. As we assume a balanced budget, the budget constraint is
T = y where y is the mean income of the population. Given this, the utility of a voter in
income group i is dened as
ui = (1  )yi + y   d2: (1)
Each citizen in income group i receives a gross wage income yi for supplying inelastically one
unit of labor. The citizen pays taxes yi and benets from the lump-sum transfer y. With
4Other examples of such a strategic use of the political participation e¤ect are Detroits black mayor Coleman
Young who discriminated against white inhabitants or the separatist Parti Quebecois, whose election in the 1970s
induced out-migration of Non-Quebecians.
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 d2 we capture any distortions, other than migration, that arise due to the wage income tax,
e.g., the distortions in the labor-leisure choices.
The income distribution in the population is given by the cumulative distribution function
F (y) with the continuous density function f(y) for y 2 [0; ymax]. f(yi) thus gives us the mass
of citizens with income yi. The mean income y is given by
y =
Z ymax
0
yf(y)dy (2)
and the median income ym is implicitly dened by
Z ym
0
f(y)dy =
1
2
: (3)
Assumption 1 The income distribution f(y) is skewed to the right and unimodal. We thus
have that ym < y.
With this assumption, we capture the empirically well-known shape of most real-world
income distributions.5 It is standard in the migration literature (see, e.g., Hansen and Kessler,
2001a and 2004)
3.2 Voting on the Welfare State: No Migration
For the political decision on the size of the welfare state, i.e., the tax rate  , we use the median
voter theorem. It is straightforward to see from the rst-order condition of the citizens utility
maximization
@ui
@
=  yi + y   2d = 0 (4)
with @
2ui
(@)2
=  2d < 0 that each citizen of income group i has a unique preferred tax rate i .
As we rule out negative tax rates, we have
0;i =
y yi
2d for yi  y
0 for yi > y
(5)
where the subscript 0 denotes the case with no migration where neither the tax base e¤ect
nor the political participation e¤ect are present. In order to be able to use the median-voter
5See, e.g. Burkhauser et al. (1996).
7
theorem, we need that the preferences for  are monotonic in the citizensindividual incomes
yi such that we can order all citizens according to their incomes. This condition is fullled in
our model: As we have that ym < y, the median must always lie in the part of the income
distribution where citizens prefer a positive tax rate. In this part of the population, preferences
for the tax rate are strictly monotonically decreasing with income (cf. (5)). Thus, the equilib-
rium tax rate in our economy is the tax rate preferred by the median voter. With conditions
(3) and (2), we can state
Lemma 1 Without migration, the unique political equilibrium is
0 =
y   ym
2d
> 0: (6)
Proof. We have that 0 > 0 as with assumption 1, the median income lies below the mean
income.
We denote the equilibrium tax rate in the case with no migration with 0. We assume that
the distortion d is high enough so that we get internal solutions for the tax rate, i.e. 0  1.
For the case in lemma 1, we would need at least that d  y ym2 . In order to assure internal
solutions for all cases, it is su¢ cient to assume:
Assumption 2 d  ymax2 :
We take 0 as our benchmark for the analysis of the e¤ects of migration on the size of the
welfare state.
3.3 Voting on the Welfare State: Migration
We now introduce mobility in our setup. In this model, we focus on the e¤ects of emigra-
tion on the political decision on the size of the welfare state to derive the implications when
considering the two distinct e¤ects - the tax base e¤ect and the political participation e¤ect:
First, emigration a¤ects the amount of tax revenues that are available for redistribution and
may therefore restrict the set of feasible redistribution policies. Second, emigration changes
the composition of the constituency and increases the political inuence of the less mobile part
of the population.6 With this model, we focus exclusively on the e¤ects of emigration in one
6Generally, an open economy will experience both emigration and immigration. Yet, focussing on emigration
only is not overly restrictive as explicitly taking immigration into account would reinforce the e¤ects we identify
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country. Therefore, we model the recipient country of our emigrants as simply as possible. Let
us assume that there is no welfare state in the destination country, i.e., the tax rate is zero. This
assumption yields the most clear-cut results. However, any setup where the recipient country
displays a smaller welfare state than the country of origin could easily be introduced and would
preserve our results. Let us further assume that all individuals receive the same gross wages in
both countries. In addition, each individual j in group i has an individual-specic component
"ij to her income in the destination country. It is related to the productivity abroad and known
to the individual before the migration decision is taken.7 This component takes an additive
form with respect to wage income such that income abroad for an individual j of income group
i is then given by yi+ "ij . For each income group yi, "ij is distributed over R with density g(")
and the cumulative distribution function G(").8 Its mean is given by  =
R
"g(")d". We do
not have to specify variance and skewness of g("), as we have the same distribution for each
income group of citizens.
When citizens do not emigrate, they remain part of the redistributive system in their
country of origin. They pay taxes proportional to their income, i.e., earn net income yi(1  ).
In addition, they receive a lump-sum transfer of the size of the average per capita tax income.
We denote the mean income after emigration with y. The citizens reach their individual
emigration decision by considering the new redistributive system after emigration, taking the
new mean income y as given.
For a given tax rate, individuals then emigrate if and only if
yi + "ij > yi(1  ) + y   d2 () "ij > (y   yi)  d2 (7)
For each income group yi, there is thus an "ij such that
"ij = (y   yi)  d2: (8)
in our model. For a model studying the political economy implications of immigration only, see Mazza and Van
Winden (1996).
7For example, "ij can be related to language skills in particular and communication skills in general with
respect to di¤erent cultural environments.
8Equally, we could use distributions with a bounded support, i.e., " and ", where " 2] 1; 0] and " 2 [0;+1[
and make additional assumptions to ensure some minimal and maximal emigration. It is crucial in our setup
that for some individuals in each income group, the individual characteristic is negative. Otherwise, all net
contributors would leave the redistributive system.
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Individuals with "ij > "ij emigrate and those with "ij < "

ij stay in the home country. Of
those f(yi) individuals with income yi, (1 G("ij)) f(yi) leave the country and G("ij)  f(yi)
decide not to migrate.
The higher the mean  of the distribution G("), the more citizens will emigrate in each
income group, given that the variance of the individual-specic components "ij is kept constant.
The reason is that the individual-specic components "ij of the citizens are then on average
higher, i.e., such that emigration leads to a higher income for more citizens. Note that we
assume that the variance of the individual-specic components "ij is kept constant, as otherwise
we could construct constellations where the mean of the distribution increases while the mass of
citizens has an "ij below the emigration threshold. Yet, this assumption seems plausible as we
think of the individual-specic components "ij as language or communication skills. While the
general opportunuties to acquire such skills can improve in an economy, the indivdual abilities
to use such opportunities will generally not change.
We can thus use  to capture the general migration propensity in the population.9 Formally,
@(1 G("ij))
@
> 0: (9)
If we compare di¤erent income groups we unambiguously nd that higher income groups
are more prone to emigrate than lower income groups. The cuto¤ level "ij is the smaller, the
higher the income of citizens yi
@"ij
@yi
=   < 0 (10)
This is very plausible, as richer citizens benet less from the redistributive system or are
even net contributors. Note that because some citizens will have very negative individual-
specic characteristics "ij , some individuals from each income group of net contributors will
always remain in the country.
It will turn out to be useful to see how the e¤ect of the income changes with a change in
the tax rate. For this, we look at
9The shape (variance and/or skewness) of the distribution of the individual-specic components "ij would
be another way to capture the migration propensity in the population. If, for each income group, the mass of
citizens shifts in such a way that more citizens have individual-specic components "ij above the emigration
threshold, the overall propensity to emigrate is increased.
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@2("ij)
@yi@
=  1 < 0: (11)
Thus, we have that an increase in the tax rate increases emigration more for higher income
groups than for lower ones.
We can also look at the change in emigration behavior in response to a change in the tax
distortion d. With a more distortive tax system, we get higher emigration. Formally,
@"ij
@d
=  2 < 0: (12)
This is intuitive as citizens su¤er from a distortive tax system when they stay in the country
and can escape from it by emigrating.
For our analysis, it is convenient to summarize the emigration behavior in a general mi-
gration function. The share of citizens who leave the country as a function of their income
y, the tax rate  , and the general propensity to emigrate in the population, , is given by
E = E(;  ; y): We can summarize our ndings on the emigration behavior by stating
Lemma 2 The share of citizens who emigrate is given by E(;  ; y): The proportion of em-
igrants increases with the overall propensity to migrate  and the income group yi; @E@ > 0;
@E
@y > 0: Furthermore, the proportion of citizens who emigrate in reaction to a tax increase is
the higher, the higher the income group, i.e. @
2E
@y@ > 0.
Proof. For the proof, see the discussion above. From our comparative statics result in
(9) it immediately follows that @E@ > 0: The mass of citizens in an income group with "ij >
"ij increases with . From (10) is is clear that
@E
@y > 0. Finally, from (11), we get that the
threshold level for emigration decreases - and therefore emigration increases - the more with
the tax rate, the higher the income group, i.e., @
2E
@y@ > 0.
Our emigration function E(;  ; y) is in line with two empirical observations. First, we have
that 0 < E(;  ; 0) < E(;  ; ymax) < 1, i.e., the proportion of citizens who emigrate increases
with the income of citizens and is bounded from below and above such that from each income
group some individuals but never all emigrate. The rich are more prone to migrate than the
poor as they are the net contributors to the redistributive system. This is true in particular
if the destination country has a smaller, or, in the extreme, no welfare state. This view is
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supported by a number of empirical studies that document a positive correlation between the
propensity to migrate and the education level of individuals where the education level can be
taken as a proxy for lifetime income.10 Second, individuals are heterogeneous with respect
to the impact of working abroad on their productivity, for example, due to di¤erent language
skills. Thus, usually only some and not all individuals with a certain income leave the country.
The migration behavior as described by E(;  ; y) leads to a change in the income distribu-
tion in the population of the country. The ratio of poor to rich increases as disproportionately
more rich than poor citizens emigrate. With migration, the income density changes to
f(y) = f(y)(1  E(;  ; y)): (13)
The after-emigration mass of the population is given by
F(ymax) =
Z ymax
0
f(y)dy =
Z ymax
0
f(y)(1  E(;  ; y))dy
=
Z ymax
0
f(y)dy  
Z ymax
0
f(y)E(;  ; y)dy < F (ymax) = 1:
In order to be able to get probability interpretations of the income distribution in the
following, we use the normalization
1
n
Z ymax
0
f(y)dy = 1, n =
Z ymax
0
f(y)dy = F(ymax) < 1 (14)
where n denotes the number of the non-migrants.
3.4 Voting on the Welfare State: Two E¤ects of Migration
Migration has potentially two e¤ects, the tax base e¤ect and the political participation e¤ect.
Note that, with the emigration behavior captured by our emigration function E(;  ; y), the
proportion of citizens who stay in the country depends on the tax rate  that is chosen in the po-
litical equilibrium. Thus, there is an interaction between the migration decision and the voting
decision. We assume a simultaneous time structure as it best captures the interdependencies
that are present in a world with migration and voting.
With mobility, each citizen has to reach two decisions at the same time: the voting decision
and the decision whether or not to emigrate. After the voting game and emigration, the new tax
10See, for example, for the issue of internal migration, Greenwood (1997) for the USA, Ledent (1990) for
Canada, or Carillo and Marselli (2003) for the case of Italy.
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policy is implemented, the transfers are paid out and the individual utilities realize. Citizens
decide whether or not to emigrate taking into account the new equilibrium tax rate. This tax
rate is determined by the new majorities where those citizens who decide to leave the country
do not participate in the voting game. Each citizen is able to derive which income group the
new median voter will belong to and can thus calculate the equilibrium outcome for the welfare
state. From the point of view of each individual citizen, the election outcome is thus given. As
she is only one member of an income group, her individual emigration decision will leave the
overall voting outcome una¤ected.11 We can also think of our simultaneous time structure as
the steady state of a dynamic process with alternating emigration and voting. Note further that
it would be uncritical to assume migration before or after voting. In the rst case, emigrants
will not vote as they have already left the country. In the second case, those who anticipate
that they will emigrate will not vote as they are not a¤ected by the new tax rate.
For our main result, in order to capture the total e¤ect of migration, we take into account
that emigrants both refrain from voting and cease to pay taxes. We will discuss the result in the
next section. In this section, we want to disentangle the two e¤ects. For this purpose, we use
a thought experiment and look at the two ctitious cases where, rst, emigrants cease to vote
and still pay taxes and second, emigrants still vote and cease to pay taxes. This means that
we consider rst the tax base e¤ect and second the political participation e¤ect in isolation.
3.4.1 The Tax Base E¤ect
When emigrants stop paying taxes, mobility reduces the total tax revenue in the home country.
The amount of government revenue that is available for redistribution shrinks. This becomes
clear when we look at the balanced budget constraint for our lump-sum transfers. With mi-
gration, the mean income y changes and is now given by y =
1
n
R ymax
0 yf(y)dy. We call this
e¤ect the tax base e¤ect.
Lemma 3 For the migration function E(;  ; y), the tax base e¤ect of emigration always leads
to a reduction of the mean income, i.e., y < y; and thus for a given tax rate  reduces the per
capita lump-sum transfers in the economy, i.e., T < T:
11This is true even for the median voter as we have many citizens of mass f(yi) of each income group yi.
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Proof. The mean income of the after-emigration population is given by
y =
1
n
Z ymax
0
yf(y)(1  E(;  ; y))dy = 1
n
[
Z ymax
0
yf(y)dy  
Z ymax
0
yf(y)E(;  ; y)dy] (15)
=
y   R ymax0 yf(y)E(;  ; y)dyR ymax
0 f(y)(1  E(;  ; y))dy
:
For y < y, this means that
y   R ymax0 yf(y)E(;  ; y)dyR ymax
0 f(y)(1  E(;  ; y))dy
< y;
or
y  
Z ymax
0
yf(y)E(;  ; y)dy < y
Z ymax
0
f(y)(1  E(;  ; y))dy
and Z ymax
0
yf(y)E(;  ; y)dy >
Z ymax
0
yf(y)E(;  ; y)dy
For @E@y > 0, this must always be true. When disproportionately more rich citizens emigrate,
the mean income of the emigrating population must be larger (left-hand side) than when all
income groups emigrate proportionally to their initial weights in the population such that the
average income of the migrants is equal to the no-emigration mean income y (right-hand side).
We thus have y < y. For a given tax rate  , this yields T
 = y < T = y.
To analyze in isolation how the tax base e¤ect changes the equilibrium tax rate, we assume
that citizens have the right to vote independently from their place of residence, i.e., there is
no political participation e¤ect. For this hypothetic case, we assume that their preferences are
the same as in the absence of migration. Reasons for this could be that the emigrants still feel
an attachment to home or plan to return to their country of origin in the future. Thus, the
identity and the income ym of the median voter do not change with emigration.
As the benchmark, we look at the case where both non-migrants and migrants have to pay
taxes. We know from our analysis (lemma 1) above, that then, the equilibrium tax rate is
0 =
y   ym
2d
: (16)
We next consider the case where the tax base e¤ect is present. That is, we assume that
emigrants do not pay taxes once they have left the country. The mean income decreases to y
(cf. (15)). Citizen is preferred tax rate is then given by
@ui
@
=  yi + y   2d = 0: (17)
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As we rule out negative tax rates, we have
 t;i =
y yi
2d for yi  y
0 for yi > y
(18)
where the subscript t indicates that only the tax base e¤ect is present. We can again apply
the median voter theorem as preferences decrease monotonically with income yi. We thus get
the equilibrium tax rate as the preferred policy of the median voter
t =
y ym
2d for ym  y
0 for ym > y:
(19)
Note that we did not impose any restrictions on the migration function E(;  ; y) that
would guarantee that the median voter ym always lies in the interval [0; y]. Thus, it is not
excluded that the tax rate preferred by the median voter is zero.
We can now identify the tax base e¤ect by comparing the equilibrium tax rates for the cases
with and without migration t and 0.
Proposition 1 When all citizens vote, the tax base e¤ect of migration strictly reduces the
equilibrium tax rate, i.e., t < 0.
Proof. The result follows directly from the comparison of conditions (6) and (19). We
know from lemma 3 that the new mean income is lower than the one without migration, i.e.,
y < y 8 > 0. Thus, t = y ym2d < 0 = y ym2d for all possible realizations of ym.
For the net contributors, emigration serves as a way to evade the tax. When staying, net
contributors prefer a tax rate of zero. For the net recipients, it is optimal to restrain themselves
and demand a lower tax rate than in the case without migration. Regardless of the position of
the median voter to the left or the right of the new mean income, we thus always get a reduction
of the tax rate. With this, we replicate the standard result in the literature, namely, that the
tax base e¤ect reduces the equilibrium tax rate and the size of the welfare state. However,
emigration has a second e¤ect, which is to shift the position of the median voter. We consider
that in the following.
3.4.2 The Political Participation E¤ect
The second e¤ect of migration concerns the political participation of emigrants. Once they
leave the country, emigrants lose their right to vote. In reality, this is the case, for example,
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when citizens move from one jurisdiction to another inside a federal state. They then lose
the right to vote in their jurisdiction of origin and automatically receive the franchise in their
jurisdiction of destination. Also, emigrants might lose the incentives to vote as they have no
stakes in the politics of their country of origin, although they would still retain voting rights
as long as they did not change their nationality.
Whenever emigrants do not vote, we have the political participation e¤ect. Emigration
changes the composition of the constituency and thus the position of the median voter. The
median income for the case with migration ym; is now implicitly given by
Z ym;
0
f(y)dy =
Z ym;
0
f(y)(1  E(;  ; y))dy = 1
2
F(ymax): (20)
Here, we do not need a normalization as the median is dened with respect to the after-
emigration mass of citizens F(ymax). Note that not only the mean but also the median income
in the case with migration depends on the equilibrium tax rate, as f(y) depends on  .
We can state
Lemma 4 For the migration function E(;  ; y), the political participation e¤ect of emigration
always leads to a reduction of the median income, i.e., ym; < ym:
Proof. We have to show that with migration, the mass of the non-emigrating citizens to
the left of the original median without migration, ym, relatively increases, while the mass of
citizens to the right of ym relatively decreases. This means we needZ ym
0
f(y)(1  E(;  ; y))dy >
Z ymax
ym
f(y)(1  E(;  ; y))dy
or Z ym
0
f(y)E(;  ; y)dy <
Z ymax
ym
f(y)E(;  ; y)dy:
The last inequality says that the mass of the emigrating citizens to the left of ym has to be
smaller than the mass of the emigrating citizens to the right of ym. This is trivially the case
here as we have constructed the migration function such that the migration incidence increases
with income, @E@y > 0. The loss of citizens due to migration to the right of the median is thus
larger than to the left. It has thus to hold for the new median that ym; < ym in order to
achieve the balance.
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Richer citizens emigrate in relatively larger proportions. Therefore, the constituency, that
is composed of all citizens who remain in the country, becomes poorer. The income distribution
of the after-emigration mass of citizens shifts towards lower incomes and the median income
after emigration is lower than without migration.
To analyze the outcome for the tax rate when only the political participation e¤ect is
present, we assume that all non-migrants and all emigrants pay taxes, i.e., there is no tax-base
e¤ect. Again, our benchmark is the case without migration, given by lemma 1,
0 =
y   ym
2d
: (21)
Next, we consider the scenario where emigrants do not vote. As emigrants still pay taxes,
the mean income is the same as without migration, i.e., y. The preferred tax rate of voter i is
p;i =
y yi
2d for yi  y
0 for yi > y
(22)
where the subscript p denotes the presence of the political participation e¤ect only. Now, with
emigration, the median income changes to ym; as dened in condition (20). The equilibrium
tax rate in this case is
p =
y   ym;
2d
> 0: (23)
In lemma 4, we have shown that migration always moves the median voter towards lower
incomes. Thus, as in our benchmark case, the income of the median voter is always left of the
mean income. Therefore, the median voter will always prefer a strictly positive tax rate.
We can now identify the political participation e¤ect by comparing the equilibrium tax
rates 0 and p:
Proposition 2 When all citizens pay taxes, the participation e¤ect of migration strictly in-
creases the equilibrium tax rate, i.e., p > 0.
Proof. The result follows directly from a comparison of conditions (6) and (23). We have
that p =
y ym;
2d > 

0 =
y ym
2d as we have shown in lemma 4 that ym; < ym.
Due to the political participation e¤ect, the composition of the constituency is changed.
The median income shifts to the left. Ceteris paribus, the new median voter thus prefers a
larger size of the welfare state.
17
4 Results: Comparison of the Equilibrium Tax Rates
4.1 The Total E¤ect of Migration
So far, we have seen that emigration leads to two opposite e¤ects: First, due to the tax
base e¤ect, emigration reduces the size of the welfare state. When voting on the tax rate,
citizens take into account that high tax rates trigger high emigration and thereby reduce the
tax base. Therefore, the median voter ceteris paribus restrains her demand for a high tax rate.
Second, we have the political participation e¤ect that increases the size of the welfare state. As
disproportionately more rich citizens emigrate, the median voter becomes poorer and ceteris
paribus prefers a higher tax rate. Thus, both the mean income and the position of the median
voter change as described in lemmas 3 and 4. The total e¤ect of emigration is ambiguous. It
depends on which of the two opposite e¤ects dominates. In order to asses the total e¤ect of
emigration on the size of the welfare state, a more structured analysis is needed.
The equilibrium in our model is dened as follows: It is a pair of a tax rate and a median
voter where, rst, the tax rate is the preferred tax rate of the median voter and second, the
median voter is the median of the after-emigration population given the tax rate. Formally, we
have tp = tp(ym;(tp)) where the tax rate chosen by the new median voter in equilibrium,
tp; when both the tax base e¤ect and the political participation e¤ect are present, is given by
tp =
y   ym;
2d
: (24)
Due to simultaneous voting and emigration, we have y = y(

tp) and ym; = ym;(

tp).
Note that, as our emigration function is such that disproportionately more citizens with
higher incomes emigrate, also the after-emigration median will always have a lower income than
the after-emigration mean income, i.e., ym; < y. The after-emigration income distribution
f(y) can never become skewed to the left. Therefore, we know that the median income lies
in the range of incomes where citizens prefer a positive tax rate and where the tax preferences
strictly monotonically decrease with income.
Because of the two opposite e¤ects of migration on the equilibrium tax rate, it is impossible
to analytically pin down whether emigration reduces or increases the size of the welfare state.
Both directions are in general possible. This has so far been overlooked in most analyses. In all
cases, migration shifts the mean income as well as the income of the median voter downwards.
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We can state
Proposition 3 The change from a closed to an open economy with emigration leads to a larger
welfare state, tp > 0, if and only if the political participation e¤ect dominates the tax base
e¤ect, i.e.,
ym   ym; > y   y: (25)
Emigration reduces the size of the welfare state if and only if the reverse relation holds.
Proof. Whether the welfare state is increased or decreased depends on the relative sizes
of the two shifts of the median and the mean income due to migration. For the equilibrium
tax rate, we get tp ? 0 () ym   ym; ? y   y:When migration has a larger impact on
the median than on the mean income, the size of the welfare state is increased. But when the
mean income is shifted by more, migration reduces the size of the welfare state.
We have identied the characteristics of the migration function in lemma 2: The rich are
more prone to emigrate than the poor. Whether median or mean are shifted by more, then
depends on the original income distribution in the economy. Note that for our results, we did
not require any restrictions for the income distribution, apart from unimodality and skewness
to the right. It is possible to construct examples for both cases. In the following, we discuss
two of these examples.
First, in order to see a case where the political participation e¤ect dominates the tax base
e¤ect and migration increases the size of the welfare state, think of an income distribution where
income is almost uniformly distributed over the income groups yi 2 [0; ymax]. Then, without
migration, we have that the median income is only slightly lower than the mean income - both
being close to ymax2 . Approximatively, we can think of a uniform distribution where the median
voter earns the mean income. When we introduce emigration where proportionally more rich
than poor emigrate, the income distribution of those who remain in the country becomes skewed
to the right. Thus, the median income is reduced by more than the mean income. Compared
to our starting point with mean and median income almost equal, this means that here, the
median income is more strongly a¤ected than the mean income. Our model predicts that in
cases where the income distribution is more or less uniform - according to proposition 3 - the
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political participation e¤ect dominates and migration increases the size of the welfare state.
The poorer median voter demands a higher tax rate in equilibrium.
Second, an example for the case where the tax base e¤ect dominates can be described with
an even simpler income distribution: Let us assume that we have only two income groups,
ylow and yhigh; where ylow < yhigh and due to our assumption of skewness f(ylow) > f( yhigh).
Then, the median voter has income ylow . The mean income, on the other hand, lies between
ylow and yhigh. When we now introduce emigration where disproportionately more rich than
poor citizens emigrate, the median income remains at ylow . The mean income is, however,
reduced. Thus, we have that migration shifts the mean income more than the median income.
This means - according to proposition 3 - that the tax base e¤ect dominates the political
participation e¤ect and that migration reduces the size of the welfare state.
Note that our model would yield identical results for the case of a disproportionate immi-
gration of the poor. As soon as the immigrants become part of the redistributive system and
members of the political constituency, such an immigration reduces the mean income and shifts
the median income to the left. This corresponds to our result from proposition 3. Allowing
both for emigration and immigration would amplify the tax base and the participation e¤ect:
Emigration of the rich and immigration of the poor, both triggered by a large welfare state,
reduces the average tax revenues. Likewise, the median voter becomes poorer because both
richer voters leave and poorer voters join the political constituency
4.2 Comparative Statics
In the last section, we have compared two cases: the closed and the open economy. For an
already open economy, we are interested in nding how a change in the migration propensity
of the population inuences the results. To see how a marginal increase in openness a¤ects the
size of the welfare state, we look at a marginal change of  (the mean of the individual-specic
components "ij), keeping the variance of the individual-specic components "ij constant. A
marginal increase of  means that the destination country becomes more attractive, for exam-
ple, as citizens acquire more language skills or other internationally applicable qualications.
In order to analyze the e¤ect of an increased migration propensity, we totally di¤erentiate
(24).
dtp
d captures the e¤ect of emigration on the equilibrium tax rate where an increase in
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the propensity to emigrate, , leads to higher emigration for all income groups (see lemma 2).
Whether the equilibrium tax rate is larger or smaller for higher , i.e., whether the political
participation e¤ect or the tax base e¤ect dominates, depends on the relative changes of the
mean and median income. We can state
Proposition 4 Emigration increases the size of the welfare state, i.e.,
dtp
d > 0, if and only if
the e¤ects of emigration on the median income are absolutely larger than on the mean income
as given by 
@y
@
+
@y
@

| {z }
<0
 

@ym;
@
+
@ym;
@

| {z }
<0
> (2d): (26)
Emigration reduces the size of the welfare state, i.e.,
dtp
d < 0, if and only if the reverse relation
holds.
Proof. For the proof, take the total derivative
dtp
d ;
dtp
d
=
@y
@   @ym;@
(2d)  @y@ + @ym;@
(27)
and set
dtp
d > 0: This yields condition (26).
In order to sign the partial derivatives, consider again lemma 2. From there, we know that
the proportion of emigrating citizens in each income group increases with the propensity to
migrate , @E@ > 0. Moreover, we know that more citizens emigrate from an income group,
the higher the income, @E@y > 0. If the overall migration propensity increases, this means that
disproportionately more rich citizens emigrate. Therefore, as with the opening up of a closed
economy (see lemmas 3 and 4), also with a marginal increase of the migration propensity ,
mean and median income must be reduced. We thus get that @y@ < 0; and
@ym;
@ < 0.
Now, consider the derivatives @y@ and
@ym;
@ . They arise due to the simultaneous structure
of our voting and emigration decisions. A marginal increase in the migration propensity 
changes the equilibrium tax rate. @y@ and
@ym;
@ show the e¤ect of a change in the equilibrium
tax rate on the after-emigration mean and median income. We know that higher income groups
are more prone to emigrate. @
2E
@y@ > 0 in lemma 2 tells us that this income e¤ect is reinforced
with an increase in the income tax level. Then, it also has to be the case that mean and median
income are reduced by a tax increase, i.e., that @y@ < 0; and
@ym;
@ < 0.
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Overall, we thus get
dtp
d
=
<0z}|{
@y
@
 
<0z }| {
@ym;
@
(2d)  @y
@|{z}
<0
+
@ym;
@| {z }
<0
(28)
Condition (26) follows directly.
The rst term on the left hand side of condition (26) shows the change in the mean income
due to emigration. In total, the mean income is reduced by migration. The rst part, @y@ < 0,
captures the fact that a larger propensity to emigrate in the population reduces the mean
income. The second part, @y@ < 0, is due to the political choice of the tax rate. As the tax rate
increases, more citizens from higher income groups emigrate. This reduces the mean income.
The second term on the left hand side shows the shift of the position of the median voter
due to emigration. Also the median income is always reduced by migration. Here, again, the
rst part, @ym;@ < 0, captures the fact that a higher propensity to emigrate in the population
reduces the mass of rich citizens relative to poorer citizens. Thus, the median voter becomes
poorer. The second part, @ym;@ < 0, shows that an increase in the tax rate, which in turn
triggers more emigration of the rich, leads to a further shift to the left of the median voter.
Intuitively, condition (26) says that the equilibrium tax rate increases with migration when-
ever the income of the median voter is shifted by at least (2d) more than the mean income.12 In
this case, the political participation e¤ect dominates the tax base e¤ect. Even though the new
median voter takes into account that emigration reduces the tax base with an increasing tax
rate, she is su¢ ciently poor (or the change of the tax base is su¢ ciently small) to still demand
a tax rate that is higher. The tax base e¤ect, however, dominates for the opposite case, namely
if the mean income is relatively more a¤ected than the median income. The (slightly) poorer
median voter is in favor of a smaller welfare state and thus a smaller tax rate to avoid a large
reduction of the tax base.
12The total derivative (27) also shows that the equilibrium tax rate has to be lower, the larger the distortion.
This is intuitive as emigration incentives depend on the tax rate. When the tax rate is low ex ante, the incentives
to migrate are less pronounced. Then, also the e¤ects of migration should be smaller.
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5 Conclusions
The e¤ect of migration on the size of the welfare state is ambiguous. We have shown that it
does not su¢ ce to consider the tax base e¤ect only, as the results can be overturned by the
political participation e¤ect. Which case is relevant for a particular economy is in the end
an empirical question. The tax base e¤ect ceteris paribus limits the demand for higher tax
rates as citizens rationally anticipate that higher taxes induce migration and thereby reduce
the amount that is available for redistribution. In contrast, the political participation e¤ect
increases the equilibrium tax rate as the identity of the median voter changes. The new median
voter has a lower income and thus ceteris paribus prefers a larger welfare state.
With mobile companies, we intuitively get the unambiguous result where the tax base
e¤ect outweighs the political participation e¤ect and the equilibrium size of the welfare state is
reduced. In recent years, companies have quite often threatened to move abroad as a reaction
to increased tax rates. They use this threat in order to exert pressure on politicians. Our model
shows one reason why such a threat can be successful, even though it does not consider any
lobbying activities: When companies move abroad, they will usually cease to pay taxes in their
country of origin (unless they only set up foreign subsidiaries). Thus, with the emigrationof
companies, we have a - very often substantial - reduction of the tax base. On the other hand,
as most employees usually do not follow, the political participation e¤ect is rather weak.13 In
this case, we therefore have a clear dominance of the tax base e¤ect. Our model thus predicts
that an increased mobility of companies leads to a reduction in the size of the welfare state.
This is a development that we can observe in many industrialized countries today.
We can sum up our main results by relating them to the title of our paper. The economic
power of the non-voters, i.e., the emigrants, drives the tax rate down because of the tax base
e¤ect. This is, however, partially or totally counteracted by the political power of those who
stay in the country. When the e¤ect of the shift of political power towards lower income groups
is stronger than the reduction of the tax revenue due to emigration, the equilibrium tax rate
might even increase. For this case, we miss an important part of the picture if we neglect the
political participation e¤ect and focus on the tax base e¤ect only.
13 If some of the employees become unemployed, the median income might be reduced by a small extent, but
much less than in the case of emigration by citizens.
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Recognizing both e¤ects could also contribute a new aspect to the empirical debate. Many
cross-country studies that ask whether income inequality a¤ects the size of the welfare state
do not nd a signicant relationship (see, e.g., Perotti, 1996, Lindert 1996, Milanovic, 2000).
From this, the authors conclude that the median voter approach is not appropriate to explain
redistribution outcomes and other features of the political process have to be added. In the
framework of our model, the median voter approach could be saved: We show that as tax base
e¤ect and political participation e¤ect work in opposite directions, it is the relative strength of
the two e¤ects that matters. This is determined by the relative responses of mean and median
income to migration pressure and not by their absolute distance. As in particular the political
participation e¤ect only occurs in open economies, the inclusion of a countrys openness in
empirical studies might provide additional insights.
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